

## THE IMPORTANCE OF THE MEDITERRANEAN REGION FOR EUROPEAN SECURITY

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**Abstract.** Security issues in the Mediterranean region are closely related to problems of security and cooperation in Europe. This stems from the fact that the area lies in the vicinity of the European Union so the lack of peace and stability in the region have direct impact on security in Europe. From this perspective, the Mediterranean Basin is a significant challenge for the EU (especially after September 11, 2001). From a geopolitical point of view, it is possible for the EU area to confirm its ability to influence the international arena. Speaking of security in the Mediterranean region in the context of European security, the energy security should also be mentioned. The failure of the Barcelona process showed a lack of effective EU's partnership strategy for the region. The complexity of the broadly understood security in the Mediterranean region creates a large gap between "abilities and expectations" in the political dialogue. In particular, unsuccessful works towards the adoption of a common Euro-Mediterranean Charter for Peace and Stability prove how difficult is to create an effective political dialogue in the Mediterranean region. To avoid the inefficiency of the Barcelona Process (the lack of symmetry and balance), the EU must draw meaningful conclusions from its mistakes in the past, especially in relation to the future Euro-Mediterranean relations aiming at improvement of the conditions for development. In this context, a new initiative of the Union for the Mediterranean should be considered an opportunity.

The main objective of the European Union is to ensure the safety of the member states and the establishment of peace and prosperity, resulting from the creation of a ring of stable and well-managed countries around it (the ring of friends)<sup>1</sup>. That is why Brussels supports political, social and economic reforms in neighboring countries, conducted in the spirit of Western ideas of democracy and free market. The European Security Strategy of 2003 stated that EU policy in a globalized world is increasingly

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<sup>1</sup> L. Kühnhardt, *Europäische Sicherheitsstrategie und Horizonterweiterung: Die EU entdeckt den Erweiterten Nahen Osten*, (in) F. Kernic, G. Hauser (ed.), *Handbuch zur Europäischen Sicherheitspolitik*, Frankfurt 2005, p. 273-283.

dependent on external factors (European increased dependence)<sup>2</sup>. It highlighted the growing threat of international interdependence of phenomena such as terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts and organized crime<sup>3</sup>.

From 11 September 2001, an increase of threat of international terrorism and the migratory pressure, stability and security in the Mediterranean region were at a large extent, in the direct area of interest of EU. The policy towards the Commonwealth countries in the Mediterranean developed by promotion the principles of democracy<sup>4</sup> and human rights, peace and the gradual building of a free trade zone in the region, in accordance with the concept of Euro-Mediterranean Partnership<sup>5</sup>. The Barcelona Declaration of 1995 established three levels of cooperation: political and security, social and cultural and economic. The principles of cooperation are fully in line with the principles of the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), presented in 2004.

The main concern for the EU in the Mediterranean region are regional conflicts, including the Middle East conflict, bringing with them the threat of instability and terrorism. The asymmetry of economic development and the marginalization of southern countries in the global market led to the impoverishment of their societies, increase of unemployment, and consequently the development of Islamic fundamentalist movements and the rising tide of illegal immigration to EU countries as well as the spread of drug trafficking. The main goal of the Barcelona Process became to ensure peace and stability in the region, as a condition *sine qua non* for further development.

*Mare Nostrum* divides the region into two hostile worlds: aging and rich Catholic North and the Islamic south, overcrowded and poor. North is an institutionalized and integrating Europe, South is missing effective security structures and mechanisms for cooperation, based on the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes and the prevention and conflict resolution<sup>6</sup>. In such situation, the development of Euro-

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<sup>2</sup> European Council, *A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy*, Brussels, 12.12.2003, <http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf>, p. 5, COM (2003) 104 final, 3.

<sup>3</sup> B. Ferrero-Waldner, *Europe's Neighbours – Towards Closer Integration*, Brussels, 22 April 2005, [http://europa.eu.int/comm/external\\_relations/news/ferrero/2005/sp05\\_253.htm](http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/news/ferrero/2005/sp05_253.htm).

<sup>4</sup> E. Baracani, *From the EMP to the ENP: New European Pressure for Democratization*, "Journal of Contemporary European Research" 1, 2, 2005, p. 54-66.

<sup>5</sup> F. Attinà, *The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Assessed: The Realist and Liberal Views*, "European Foreign Affairs Review" 2, 2003.

<sup>6</sup> T. Tanner, *An Emerging Security Agenda for the Mediterranean*, „Mediterranean Politics”, vol. 1, no. 3, 1996; J. Monar, *Institutional Constraints of the European Union's Mediterranean Policy*, „Mediterranean Politics”, vol. 3, no. 2, 1998, p. 39-60; S. Stavridis, *Mediterranean Challenges to the EU's Foreign Policy*, „European Foreign Affairs Review”, vol. 5, 2000, p. 35-82; G. Edwards, E. Philippart, *The EU Mediterranean Policy: Virtue Unrewarded Or...?*, „Cambridge Review of International Affairs”, vol. 11, no. 1, 1997, p. 185-207; D.K. Xenakis, D.N. Chrysoschou, *Europe in Change. The Emerging Euro-Mediterranean System*, New York, 2001.

Mediterranean political dialogue and security is extremely difficult and requires numerous compromises<sup>7</sup>.

The most important platform for the development of Euro-Mediterranean dialogue on security is the NATO – Mediterranean Dialogue, developed in January 1994 with Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia (Algeria joined in 2000)<sup>8</sup>. Through the Mediterranean Dialogue, NATO carries out one of its main objectives, namely the promotion of security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area<sup>9</sup>. Its Member States also decided to exchange information, promote a positive image of NATO and build confidence<sup>10</sup>. Dialogue in its basic trend is maintained in the bilateral form<sup>11</sup>. NATO organizes training courses for officers and academics from the countries involved. Cooperation was established between the civil and military service in the field of emergency and crisis management, peacekeeping and humanitarian operations, and scientific and technical cooperation and the military aspects. The Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) was held priority for further developing cooperation in the framework of NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue. Its purpose was to strengthen political dialogue and support these reforms of the defense system, which would strengthen the national capacity to fight terrorism.

In the Mediterranean, there is also a Conference for Security and Cooperation Affairs (CSCM – Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean), Group 5 + 5, the Egyptian Initiative Forum for Dialogue and Cooperation and initiatives of the United States and the League of Arab States. All of them proved to be insufficient, mainly due to the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the lack of a common Arab standpoint towards these initiatives. The Barcelona Process is the first and so far the world's only political initiative, under which Arab countries and Israel cooperate<sup>12</sup>.

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<sup>7</sup> B. Crawford, *Why the Euro-Med Partnership? Explaining the EU's Strategies in the Mediterranean Region*, Berkeley 2006.

<sup>8</sup> I.O. Lesser, *NATO Looks South. New Challenges and New Strategies In the Mediterranean*, RAND, 2000; R. Mendez Aleman, *La Sécurité Méditerranéenne. L'OTAN est-elle la solution?*, Bruxelles 2000; N. Jebnoun, *L'espace Méditerranéen: les enjeux de la coopération et de la sécurité entre les rives nord et sud à l'aube du XXème siècle*, NATO Defence College 2003.

<sup>9</sup> I.O. Lesser, *The Future of NATO's Mediterranean Initiative: Evolution and Next Steps*, RAND MR-1164-SDM.

<sup>10</sup> A. Abd Alaziz, *Balance of threat perception and the prospects of NATO Mediterranean Dialogue*, Final Report, 2003, p. 6-7.

<sup>11</sup> A. Bin, *The Security Dialogue towards Mediterranean*, „Revista CI-DOB d'Afers Internacionals”, no. 49, 2000.

<sup>12</sup> F. Neugart, T. Schumacher, *Thinking about the EU's Future Neighborhood Policy in the Middle East Partnership*, (in) Ch.P. Hanley, G. Luciani, F. Neugart, *Regime Change in Iraq*, Florence, RSCAS Press 2004; R. del Sarto, A. Tovias, *Caught between Europe and the Orient: Israel and the EMP*, „The International Spectator”, vol. 36, no. 4, 2001, p. 61-75; L. Guazzone, R. Owen, *State, Power and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East*, London 2000; A. Hawthorne, *Political Reform in the Arab World: A New Ferment?*, „Carnegie Papers”, no. 52, 2004, p. 5-7.

As defined in the Barcelona Declaration of 1995, the idea of safety is shared by all members of the Process (comprehensive security). The European Union has applied the term in the overall meaning, drawing the model of the CSCE Final Act. Three-dimensional structure of the Partnership is designated for a political dialogue on the security issues associated with threats to business, social, and for the environment. It is based on the interaction between the concept of security closely connected with the construction of the development of trust and mutual support, followed by the creation of a "common space"<sup>13</sup>.

The Middle East conflict has been the most important factor determining the development of political dialogue within the Barcelona Process. The question arises whether the European Union is able to effectively influence its resolution? Brussels is involved from the beginning to this peace process in the Middle East and supports two basic principles. The first is the principle of respect for the UN Security Council resolution condemning the use of violence, irrespective of the abuser, and the principle of aiming to achieve agreement between the parties to the conflict. Declarative, not the creative character of Brussels has often been criticized by the world's politicians. The European Union is the other main provider of humanitarian aid to the Palestinians. In 1996, the EU sent to the Middle East its Special Envoy, Miguel Moratinos, replaced by Marc Otten in July 2003. In addition, the High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy frequently participated in numerous political negotiations and the Middle East peace talks. European efforts have political significance, however, are limited due to lack of credibility among the Arab states. The EU seems to be unable to take effective action, which could lead to peace between Israel and Palestine. The United States are in fact regarded as the sole guarantor of the Middle East peace agreements, and therefore participation in the European Union is marginalized and non-effective. Speaking of security in the Mediterranean region in the context of European security, the energy security should also be mentioned<sup>14</sup>. European strategy for energy security also includes cooperation with Mediterranean countries<sup>15</sup>.

The failure of the Barcelona process showed a lack of effective EU's partnership strategy for the region. The complexity of the broadly understood security in the Mediterranean region creates a large gap between "abilities and expectations" in the

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<sup>13</sup> P.J. Borkowski, *Partnerstwo Eurośroziemnomorskie*, Warsaw 2005, p. 82-89; P.J. Borkowski, *Polityka Unii Europejskiej w regionie śródziemnomorskim w kontekście przeciwdziałania terroryzmowi*, (in) W. Lizak, L. Łukaszuk, E. Śliwka, *Współczesny terroryzm międzynarodowy*, Warsaw 2004, p. 183-185; C. Spencer, *Partnership-building in the Mediterranean*, „The International Spectator”, vol. 34, no. 4, 1999, p. 61-66.

<sup>14</sup> V. Colete, *What is international economic security?*, „International Affairs” 1995, vol. 71, no. 2, p. 305-324.

<sup>15</sup> S. Parzymies, *Bezpieczeństwo i współpraca w regionie Morza Śródziemnego – wielkie wyzwanie dla Europy*, „Stosunki Międzynarodowe – International Relations”, no. 3-4 (t. 40) 2009, p. 22-23.

political dialogue<sup>16</sup>. In particular, unsuccessful works towards the adoption of a common Euro-Mediterranean Charter for Peace and Stability prove how difficult is to create an effective political dialogue in the Mediterranean region<sup>17</sup>. In 1995, in France, it has been originally proposed to draft a document addressing separately and globally the issue of security and stability in the Mediterranean region. The proposal was inspired by the Balladur Plan for Central and Eastern Europe. The initiative provided for the introduction of a peaceful resolution of disputes, building of confidence, development of regional and cross-border cooperation and the preventive diplomacy principle<sup>18</sup>. The guidelines for confidence-building measures were also suggested, except for one problem, namely the Middle East conflict. The guidelines covered the strengthening of peace and stability in the region, the promotion of common values and principles, resolving economic and social problems and building the confidence. The Charter for Peace and Stability in the Mediterranean region referred to the principles of peace-keeping<sup>19</sup>. Its adoption caused objection of the Southern states, claiming that only the EU definition of security has been included in the Charter. The main dispute between the countries of North and South concerned the strategy of promoting democracy in countries of the South<sup>20</sup>. For the European Union, the process of democratic transformation, based on the principles of international law and human rights was a *sine qua non* for ensuring the security in the region. For the Southern countries, it meant the imposition by Brussels of its standards of conduct. These countries were of the opinion it is a violation of the principle of equality enshrined in the Barcelona Declaration. For those countries, the lack of democracy in the region did not constitute a main cause for conflict therein, as there were also the unresolved territorial disputes and a lack of strategic balance in the Middle East, where only Israel has nuclear weapons.

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<sup>16</sup> Ch. Hill, *The Capability-Expectations Gap or Conceptualizing Europe's International Role*, "Journal of Common Market Studies", vol. 31, no. 3, 1993 r., p. 305-328.

<sup>17</sup> C. Spencer, *The EU and Common Strategies: The Revealing Case of the Mediterranean*, "European Foreign Affairs Review", vol. 6, 2001, p. 31-51; D. Hunt, I. Romeo, *The European Union and North Africa: Keeping the Mediterranean: the Barcelona Process Five Years On*, London 2000; M. Ortega, *Military Dialogue in the Euro-Mediterranean Charter: An Unjustified Absence*, "The International Spectator", vol. XXXV, no. 1, 2000, p. 115-125.

<sup>18</sup> S.C. Calleya, *The Euro-Mediterranean Process After Malta: What Prospects?*, "Mediterranean Politics", vol. 2, no. 2, 1997, p. 1-22.

<sup>19</sup> F. Áttina, *Partnership and Security: Some Theoretical and Empirical Reasons for Positive Developments in the Euro-Mediterranean Area*, (in) F. Áttina, S. Stavridis, *The Barcelona Process and Euro-Mediterranean Issues from Stuttgart to Marseille*, Milano 2001, p. 44-46.

<sup>20</sup> F. Tanner, *The Euro-Mediterranean Security Partnership: Prospect for Arms Limitation and Confidence Building*, (in) Á. de Vasconcelos, G. Joffé, *The Barcelona Process: Building a Euro-Mediterranean Regional Community*, London 2000, p. 189-206; R. Aliboni, *Confidence-Building, Conflict Prevention and Arms Control in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership*, "Perceptions", vol. II, no. 4, 1997-1998, p. 73-86; L. Guazzzone, *Who Needs Conflict Prevention in the Mediterranean?*, "The International Spectator", vol. XXXV, no. 1, 2000, p. 83-102.



Southern countries therefore sought to develop the Charter provisions on disarmament. The socio-cultural understanding of concepts relating to human rights and the fight against terrorism proved to be problematic<sup>21</sup>.

The allegation, which the creators of the Euro-Mediterranean Charter for Peace and Stability met from the beginning, related to their concerns focused on the principles of soft security, discussing the confidence-building measures and the conflicts prevention<sup>22</sup> and bypassing the solutions for existing disputes. At the Euro-Mediterranean Conference in Valencia in April 2002, it has been agreed to strengthen political dialogue and to include preventive diplomacy and defense issues. It was also decided to develop a common approach to overcoming terrorism (this was included in the ongoing global debate on the fight against terrorism) and broadening the dialogue on human rights and measures to build partnerships (Partnership Building Measures), in place of the controversial CBMs (Confidence Building Measures). European solutions used in the Charter were seen as a consolidation of the political *status quo*. For the South countries it was not acceptable, primarily due to the numerous conflicts in the region. For Europe, the main source of danger was the low level of economic development. In Valencia, the necessity of cooperation in the fight against drug trafficking, organized crime, terrorism, illegal immigration<sup>23</sup> and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction<sup>24</sup> has also been underlined.

After the American intervention in Iraq, the foreign ministers of EU countries, meeting in Crete in May 2003, expressed concern about preserving the integration, territorial integrity and sovereignty of Iraq and development of stability in the region in cooperation with the United Nations. At the Euro-Mediterranean Conference in Naples in December 2003, leaders of the Barcelona process, discussed in detail the issues of European Security and Defense and promotion of human rights and democracy in the region. It was decided that the area of the

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<sup>21</sup> A. Ojeda, *Euro-Mediterranean Partnership*, "Review of International Affairs", vol. XLVIII, no. 1062, 15 1997, p. 12-13; F. Tanner, *The Mediterranean Pact: A Framework for Soft Security Cooperation*, "Perceptions", vol. I, no. 4, 1996/97, p. 56-67; C. Echeverria, *Cooperation in Peacekeeping among the Euro-Mediterranean Armed Forces*, "Chaillot Papers", no. 35, 1999, p. 11.

<sup>22</sup> R. Aliboni, *Common Languages on Democracy in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership*, EuroMesCo Working Group I, "EuroMesCo Paper", no. 31, 2004.

<sup>23</sup> R. Gillespie, *Reshaping the Agenda? The Internal Politics of the Barcelona Process in the Aftermath of September 11*, (in) A. Jünemann, *Euro-Mediterranean Relations after September 11 International, Regional and Domestic Dynamics*, London, 2003, p. 21-36.

<sup>24</sup> European Council, *EU Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction*, Brussels, 12-13 2003; Council Secretariat and European Commission, *Basic principles for a EU strategy against Proliferation of Weapon of Mass Destruction*, Doc. 10352/03, Brussels, 2003; M. El-Sayed Selim, *Towards a New WMD Agenda in the Euro-Mediterranean: An Arab Perspective*, (in) Á. de Vasconcelos, G. Joffé, *The Barcelona Process. Building a Euro-Mediterranean Regional Community*, "Mediterranean Politics", vol. 5, no. 1, 2000, p. 133-157.

Mediterranean has become a common space<sup>25</sup>, which will be included in the Euro-Maghreb and Euro-Mashrek Initiatives<sup>26</sup>. At a conference in Barcelona in 2005, the leaders adopted a five-year program for the continued functioning of the Euro-Mediterranean and a special Code of Conduct on Countering Terrorism (Euro-Mediterranean Code of Conduct on Countering Terrorism.). They also called for a peaceful solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict and the use of the Barcelona Process as a platform for its limitation<sup>27</sup>.

The European Union considered the main threat to its radicalization of Islamic movements and related terrorism and the legal and illegal immigration. According to the definition of multidimensional security, Brussels believes that the lack of economic development of Southern countries and the subsequent unemployment, lead to the radicalization of social and Islamic groups<sup>28</sup>. It should be noted that before 11 September 2001, Islamic terrorism and related threats were considered so-called external threat. Today, they are referred to as an internal matter of European security. Growing Muslim population, migration pressures in the Arab countries are also a major problem. Social marginalization of the minorities raises social tensions. Europe is facing a crisis of national and civilization identity. Muslims living in Europe are claiming the observance of their rights, including rights to their own religion<sup>29</sup>. For this reason, Arab immigrants are reluctant to be accommodated in the European Union. Islam is now the second largest professed religion in Europe, after Catholicism. The terrorist attacks in 2001 caused an increase in discrimination against Arab immigrants in Europe. Centre for Monitoring Racism and Xenophobia Phenomena (European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia EUMC) published a series of reports and surveys on public opinion, confirming the idea that Muslims were targeted enemy attacks in the societies of

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<sup>25</sup> M. Heller, *Reassessing Barcelona*, (in) F. Tanner (ed.), *The European Union as a Security Actor in the Mediterranean. ESPD, Soft Power and Peacemaking in Euro-Mediterranean Relations*, Zurich 2001, p. 77; M. Pace, *Rethinking the Mediterranean. Reality and Re-Presentation in the Creation of a Region*, (in) F. Laursen, *Comparative Regional Integration: Theoretical Perspectives*, Ashgate 2004.

<sup>26</sup> *Presidency Conclusions of the Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs*, Naples 2-3 December 2003, "EuroMed Report" no. 71, 5 2003; Á. De Vasconcelos, R. Aliboni, A.M. Said Aly, „EuroMesCo Report" 1997/1998; C. Spencer, *Building confidence in the Mediterranean*, "Mediterranean Politics", vol. 2, no. 2, 1997, p. 23-41; R. Aliboni, *Political Dialogue and Conflict Prevention in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership*, "The International Spectator", vol. 35, no. 4, 2000, p. 103-114.

<sup>27</sup> H. Amirah-Fernandez, R. Youngs, *The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: Assessing the First Decade*, FRIDE, 2005; R. Gillespie, *Reshaping the agenda? The internal politics of the Barcelona Process in aftermath of September 11*, "Mediterranean Politics", 8(2-3), 2003, p. 22-36.

<sup>28</sup> R. Gunde, *Preparing Europe in the twenty-first century: united by terrorism, divided by history*, UCLA/CEES, 26 2004.

<sup>29</sup> L. Dris-Aït Hamadouche, *Europe, Security and Islamism: Misunderstandings and Manipulations*, "Journal of Contemporary European Studies", vol. 17, no. 3, 2009, p. 339-351.

many EU countries<sup>30</sup>. Islam has become synonymous of danger, and the tendency of linking these notions increases. This conceptual confusion leads to blurring a distinction between fundamentalism, extremism and Islam<sup>31</sup>.

We notice this by observing the growing popularity of radical right-wing groups in Europe. In its public rhetoric, far-right parties consider Muslims to be the greatest threat to European security, accusing them of taking over jobs of Europeans. Such demands go on fertile ground in EU, where 33% of citizens describe themselves as “racists”<sup>32</sup>. According to calculations, the number of Muslims in Europe within next 25 years will double<sup>33</sup>. Experts estimate that Europe will be flooded with the “Islamic tsunami”, creating a new social identity and religious culture of the EU – “Eurarabia”. This literature calls this phenomenon a “secularization of Islam”. For the experts dealing with international terrorism, Islamic movements reject by definition everything that comes from West. They are also prepared to fight with its values. That prevents common existence of followers of Islam to the Western world.

André Malraux said in 1974 that “the political idea of uniting Europe needs a common enemy and the only common enemy of Islam is her”. It seems that this statement is still up to date. Both, the idea of “clash of civilizations” and the fight against international terrorism after September 11, 2001, became a prevailing argument for EU to cooperate with authoritarian regimes in the South. Europe must look for compromise and peaceful means for coexistence with Islam. It does not need a common enemy but the efficient and effective strategies, capable of creating its environment secure and stable, to face the world and effectively develop cooperation with the Mediterranean’s threats.

The European Union seems to be currently powerless against the problems of radical Islamic movements within the Muslim minority in Europe. On the anniversary summit in Barcelona in 2005, summarizing ten years operation of the Barcelona process, representatives of most of the Southern states were not present, which clearly shows the lack of success of this initiative. Besides, the lack of agreement in the Middle East and of reforms in Arab countries as well as the spread of terrorism and misunderstandings increase the gap between the North and South and impact negatively on the development of Euro-Mediterranean cooperation. The

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<sup>30</sup> S. Ahmad, *Muslims in Europe: perceptions of discrimination and Islamophobia*, 22.08.2008; <http://indianmuslims.in/muslims-in-europe-perceptions-of-discrimination-and-islamophobia-i/>; C. Allen, J. Nielsen, *Summary Report on Islamophobia in the EU after 11 September 2001*, Vienna: European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia, 2002.

<sup>31</sup> M. Milson, *Réforme et islamisme dans le monde arabe aujourd’hui*, Middle East Media Research Institute, „Dossiers spéciaux”, no. 34, 2004.

<sup>32</sup> L. Evans, *Is Europe unable to assimilate its growing Islamic minority?*, Centre for European and Eurasian Studies, 26.05.2004.

<sup>33</sup> R. Israeli, *The Spread of Islamikaze Terrorism in Europe: The Third Islamic Invasion of Europe*, 2007.



failure of the Barcelona Process has opened a public debate on the need to increase the efficiency of Europe's Mediterranean policy. Brussels response to such demands was to be Union for the Mediterranean<sup>34</sup>.

The concept of the Union, after its inventor the French President, Nicolas Sarkozy, was to be a response to "changing world" and new conditions for the development of the Barcelona Process (geopolitical and economic changes in the Mediterranean region, the escalation of conflict in the Middle East, consequences of 11 September 2001, the war in Iraq, the EU enlargement in 2004 and 2007, and new tensions in the Maghreb countries). Union for the Mediterranean, as a "union project" has been based on the implementation of regional programs that are complementary to ongoing initiatives of the Barcelona Process and ENP<sup>35</sup>.

Senior officials who dealt with the work on strengthening the Euro-Mediterranean cooperation in the field of security and defense, at the *ad hoc* meeting in Brussels, 13 June 2007<sup>36</sup>, decided to deepen the dialogue on military affairs and security. They discussed this at a seminar organized by the European Institute for Strategic Studies in Rabat in the first half of 2008. The main theme of the work of the European College for Defense and Security was crisis management. EU countries have decided to set up a special program for the protection of civilians in the Mediterranean (Euro-Med Bridge Program in the field of Civil Protection)<sup>37</sup>. The members of this program are: Algeria, Egypt, France and Italy, as well as the European Commission and EU Council. In March 2009, the Member States have decided, in accordance with the provisions of the Paris Declaration of 2008, to establish a Euro-Mediterranean security program, preventing and combating natural disasters and those caused by human activities (Euro-Mediterranean Regional Programme for Prevention, Preparedness and Response to Natural and Man-Made Disasters South PPRD). It was also decided that the Action Plans under the European Neighborhood Policy will contain provisions on the development of Euro-Mediterranean cooperation in the field of conflict resolution at the regional and multilateral, including the participation of relevant groups of civil and military representatives<sup>38</sup>. Protection of civilians is one of the six key objectives of the cooperation of the Paris Declaration. Growth of organized crime on the Mediterranean Sea, the activities of terrorist groups and

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<sup>34</sup> E. Barbé, *The Union for the Mediterranean: From the Europeanization of foreign policy to the de-communitarisation of Mediterranean policy*, "Revista de Derecho Coinunitario Europeo", 32, 2009, p. 11-48.

<sup>35</sup> A. Saaf, *L'Union pour la Méditerranée et les acquis civils de Barcelone*, EU-ISS, Paris, no. 22, 2008.

<sup>36</sup> *Conclusions of the 9th Euro-Mediterranean Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs*, Lisbon, 5-6.11.2007, <http://www.consilium.eu.int/uedocs/NewsWord/en/er/96969.doc>.

<sup>37</sup> P. Courel, *Civil Protection as a EuroMediterranean Project: the Case for Practical Co-operation*, „EuroMeSCo Papers”, no. 34, 2004.

<sup>38</sup> *Communication from the Commission on strengthening the European Neighborhood Policy*, COM(2006)726 final, Brussels, 4.12.2006, p. 10.

drugs and men trafficking, has prompted the Union for the Mediterranean to develop appropriate action plans to counter these threats.

During the ministerial conference held in Marseilles in November 2008, the participants adopted the Program of Actions for the Union for the Mediterranean for 2009. The unstable situation in the Middle East and the global economic crisis caused some objectives of the Action Plan not being implemented. At the meeting in Marseilles, the ministers stressed that the main objective of the Union for the Mediterranean is to ensure peace, security and prosperity. They decided to continue work for “a fair, comprehensive and permanent solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict” (“fair, comprehensive and permanent settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict”), creating a partnership-building measures and the implementation of major regional projects aimed at sustainable development of countries of the South, the promotion of democracy and respect for the human rights as well as the implementation of the Code of Combating Terrorism. The political dialogue on security matters is based on regular meetings of senior officials, monitoring the situation in the Middle East and initiating the bilateral meetings between Israel and the Palestinian Autonomy<sup>39</sup> (however, since January 2009, so such meeting has been successfully held). The major part of the Paris Declaration, concerning the problem of security in the region, refers to military matters (e.g. non-proliferation of the weapons of the mass destruction, confidence-building measures, defense issues.) The Declaration of Marseille confirmed that the Member States did not reach a compromise in respect of the security and political dialogue – these matters were not addressed<sup>40</sup>.

For many countries of the Union for the Mediterranean, it is another chance to launch peace talks between Israel and Arab states. Despite objections from Tel Aviv, the League of Arab States has gained observer status in the new initiative. On the other hand, as a result of Israeli protests, the work of the Union for the Mediterranean have been blocked in 2009. President Nicolas Sarkozy, in his speech during the annual conference of ambassadors held in Paris in November 2009, announced that the second summit of the Union for the Mediterranean in 2010 should be accompanied by peace negotiations, leading to speeding up the peace process in the Middle East. However, this statement has not been included in the official conference report and taking into account the tense relations in the Middle East, this initiative does not seem to have much chances for success in the near future.

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<sup>39</sup> *Agreed Conclusions of the 9th Euro-Mediterranean Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs*, Lisbon, 5-6.11.2007, <http://www.eu2007.pt/NR/rdonlyres/FF7CA6E4-5980-4B3A-A3B6-00-D072967697/0/9 ReuniaoEuromedMNES.pdf>.

<sup>40</sup> E. Soler i Lecha, *Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean. Genesis, evolution and implications for Spain's Mediterranean Policy*, Fundación Alternativas, CIDOB, “Documento de trabajo” 28/2008.

Security issues in the Mediterranean region are closely related to problems of security and cooperation in Europe<sup>41</sup>. This stems from the fact that the area lies in the vicinity of the European Union so the lack of peace and stability in the region have direct impact on security in Europe. From this perspective, the Mediterranean Basin is a significant challenge for the EU (especially after September 11, 2001). From a geopolitical point of view, it is possible for the EU area to confirm its ability to influence the international arena. Objectives and priorities of the Union for the Mediterranean have been ambitiously set until 2020. To avoid the inefficiency of the Barcelona Process (the lack of symmetry and balance), the EU must draw meaningful conclusions from its mistakes in the past, especially in relation to the future Euro-Mediterranean relations aiming at improvement of the conditions for development.

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**Streszczenie.** Problemy bezpieczeństwa w regionie śródziemnomorskim pozostają w ścisłym związku z problemami bezpieczeństwa i współpracy w Europie. Wynika to z tego, że obszar ten znajduje się w bezpośrednim sąsiedztwie Unii Europejskiej, zaś jego problemy (brak pokoju i stabilności) wpływają bezpośrednio na bezpieczeństwo w Europie. Z tego punktu widzenia basen Morza Śródziemnego jest dla UE wielkim wyzwaniem (szczególnie po 11 września 2001 roku). Z geopolitycznego punktu widzenia jest on obszarem możliwości dla UE oraz potwierdzeniem jej zdolności oddziaływania na arenie międzynarodowej. Mówiąc o bezpieczeństwie w regionie śródziemnomorskim w kontekście bezpieczeństwa europejskiego, należy także wspomnieć o bezpieczeństwie energetycznym. Niepowodzenia procesu barcelońskiego wskazały na brak efektywnej, unijnej strategii partnerstwa dla regionu. Złożoność szeroko rozumianego bezpieczeństwa w regionie Morza Śródziemnego sprawia, że powstaje duża luka między „zdolnościami a oczekiwaniami” w dialogu politycznym. O tym, jak trudno w regionie śródziemnomorskim tworzyć efektywny dialog polityczny, świadczą zakończone niepowodzeniem prace nad przyjęciem wspólnej Eurośródziemnomorskiej Karty dla Pokoju i Stabilności. Aby uniknąć nieefektywności procesu barcelońskiego (brak jego symetrii i równowagi), UE musi wyciągnąć konstruktywne wnioski z błędów popełnionych w przeszłości, by przyszłe stosunki eurośródziemnomorskie miały lepsze warunki rozwoju. W tym kontekście szansą jest nowa inicjatywa Unii dla Śródziemnomorza.